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Abstract. Numerous previous works have studied deep learning algorithms applied
in the context of side-channel attacks, which demonstrated the ability to perform
successful key recoveries. These studies show that modern cryptographic devices
are increasingly threatened by side-channel attacks with the help of deep learning.
However, the existing countermeasures are designed to resist classical side-channel
attacks, and cannot protect cryptographic devices from deep learning based side-
channel attacks. Thus, there arises a strong need for countermeasures against deep
learning based side-channel attacks. Although deep learning has the high potential
in solving complex problems, it is vulnerable to adversarial attacks in the form of
subtle perturbations to inputs that lead a model to predict incorrectly.
In this paper, we propose a kind of novel countermeasures based on adversarial
attacks that is specifically designed against deep learning based side-channel attacks.
We estimate several models commonly used in deep learning based side-channel
attacks to evaluate the proposed countermeasures. It shows that our approach can
effectively protect cryptographic devices from deep learning based side-channel attacks
in practice. In addition, our experiments show that the new countermeasures can
also resist classical side-channel attacks.
Keywords: Side-Channel Attacks · Countermeasures · Adversarial Attack · Deep
Learning
1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks (SCA) are a major threat to embedded devices [YSG+19]. They can
use only a limited budget to recover the keys of cryptographic devices. The side-channel
attacks exploit the side-channel information of a cryptographic computation to recover
sensitive data. The side-channel information includes power consumption, electromagnetic
radiations, and running-time, etc. They can recover sensitive data values in very few
side-channel observations. The profiling attacks [CRR02] are one of the most powerful
side-channel attacks. In this scenario, the adversary may precisely tune all the parameters
of the cryptographic device, and characterize the correlation between the physical leakage
and sensitive data value. They can predict the sensitive value on a target device containing
a secret they wish to retrieve by using multiple traces.
Very similar to profiling attacks, deep learning algorithms are also used in the context
of side-channel attacks [CDP17,PSB+18,KPH+19,MPP16,Tim19]. Some recent studies
have demonstrated the robustness of deep learning techniques to the most common
countermeasures [MPP16,MDP20, CDP17]. Deep learning techniques are at least as
effective as classical profiled attacks. Today, security components are embedded everywhere,
so deep learning based side-channel attacks have become a major threat to many everyday
life objects. Facing the application of deep learning techniques in the context of SCA,
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2 Adversarial Attack Based Countermeasures against Deep Learning SCA
the classical security protections designed to thwart classical side-channel attacks can no
longer protect modern security components. Therefore, there arises a strong need for new
countermeasures that can protect cryptographic devices against deep learning attacks.
1.1 Related Work
Singh et al. [SKM+18] exploited random dynamic voltage and frequency scaling to thwart
SCA. Courousse et al. [CBR+16] presented a code morphing runtime framework to resist
SCA. Boulet et al. [BBL13] described the protection of electronic devices against hidden-
channel analysis. The protection converts the original codes to functionally equivalent
codes by a modified compiler. Coron et al. [CK10] mitigated side-channel attacks by
the execution of dummy instructions. Ambrose et al. [ARP07] proposed to randomly
insert a limited set of randomly selected instructions. They argued that such instructions
could protect devices. As compared to our work, these previous works insert randomly
selected instructions into the entire algorithm or the entire sensitive function. Our main
contribution is to select the best suitable noise instructions and determine the exact
insertion position.
Some recent studies have demonstrated the robustness of deep learning techniques
against the most common countermeasures [MPP16,MDP20,CDP17]. Therefore, there
arises a strong need for new countermeasures that can protect cryptographic devices against
deep learning attacks. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, the only former work
that uses adversarial attacks to resist SCA is carried out by Picek et al. [PJB19]. However,
different from our work, they just modified each side-channel trace into adversarial samples.
The experiments in this paper show that turning each side-channel trace into an adversarial
trace is not an effective countermeasure.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we present a kind of countermeasures against the deep learning based
side-channel attacks. The key idea of our approach is to add adversarial perturbations to
the cryptographic algorithm implementation during compilation. We propose an approach
to select adversarial perturbation instructions, and where to insert these instructions.
Moreover, we also evaluate the security of our countermeasures by experiments.
In our experiments, we use two different deep learning techniques to assess the security
level of our countermeasures: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN). The experimental results show that our countermeasures can reach a high
level of security under deep learning based SCA. We also evaluate the performance of our
approach under the classical side-channel attacks. Template attacks (TA) are exploited to
attack our countermeasures, and the experiment shows that our method can thwart such
attacks.
1.3 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. After describing notations and terminology in Section
2.1, Sections 2.2 and 2.3 give some background on side-channel techniques and adversarial
attacks. The threat model is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe our
countermeasures in detail. Some experiments are implemented in Section 5. Section 6
concludes this paper.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and Terminology
In this paper, k∗ denotes secret keys, K denotes the set of all possible keys, and Dprofiling
denotes the profiling dataset which contains the profiling traces dataset Tprofiling and the
profiling labels dataset Lprofiling. The profiling traces dataset contains N profiling traces,
and each trace is composed of n time samples. The profiling labels dataset contains the
classes/labels which follows the ML classification meaning for each profiling trace. Dattack
denotes the attack dataset, and it contains Tattack and Lattack, where Tattack contains M
attack traces. We train neural network using Dprofiling and obtain a deep learning model.
Model() denotes the model we trained.
Given an input trace, Model() aims to compute an output called a prediction vector
d ∈ Rm, where m represents the number of possible classes/labels corresponding to the
input trace. Each component in d represents the confidence of corresponding possible
class/label. For example, in Figure 1, the label of the traces is the least significant bit of
the third key byte corresponding to the traces, [0.4294791, 0.57052094] indicates that the
confidence of label 0 is 0.4294791, and the confidence of label 1 is 0.57052094. The trace
is classified as class 1, because the confidence of class 1 is greater than the confidence of
class 0.
Figure 1: One-pixel attack on side-channel traces. The label of (a) is 0. The trace is
labeled with the least significant bit of the output of the third Sbox during the first
round, LSB(Sbox(p[3]⊕ k[3])). The prediction vector of (a) is [0.8141893, 0.18581069], it
is classified as class 0. So the classification of (a) is correct. (b) is obtained by modifying
the value of (a) at the 440th time sample. (b) is incorrectly classified as class 1.
Below we introduce some definitions, which are related to adversarial attacks against
deep learning based side-channel attacks. The definitions of these terms are similar to
those of adversarial attacks in computer vision area [MMS+18]. The rest of this paper
follows these definitions.
• Adversarial example/trace is a trace obtained by adding noise on the cryptographic
devices to obfuscate the deep learning classifier.
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• Adversarial perturbation is the noise added to the cryptographic devices when
generating adversarial trace.
• Black-box attacks mean that the adversary attacks a deep learning model without
the structure and parameters knowledge. When the adversary may have information
about the structure and parameters of the model, we call it white-box attacks.
• Targeted attacks fool the deep learning models to make it misclassify adversarial
traces into specified target classes/labels. They are the opposite of non-targeted
attacks. The goal of the non-targeted attack is to slightly modify the cryptographic
devices in a way that the side-channel trace will be classified incorrectly by generally
unknown deep learning classifier.
• Universal perturbation means that the same perturbation is added to different power
traces, which can make the traces misclassified by the classifier.
2.2 Side-Channel Attacks
In the real world, cryptographic algorithms always rely on a physical carrier, such as a
PC, smart card, or embedded processor. When a cryptographic algorithm is running on
a physical carrier, execution time [Koc96], power consumption [KJJ99], electromagnetic
emissions [GMO01], and other side-channel information of a cryptographic computation
are leaked. These side-channel leakages of a cryptographic computation depend on some
small part of the internally used sensitive data or sensitive operations in the cryptographic
devices, and can be exploited to recover keys. A key-recovery attack based on side-channel
leakage analysis is called a side-channel attack for simplicity.
2.2.1 Template Attack
TA can be considered as the most successful and in-depth research method in classical
SCA. In this paper, we use TA to evaluate the security level of our countermeasures.
Let us consider the target device executing a cryptographic algorithm with the secret
key k∗. The adversary may control a copy of the target device called profiling device
and priorly use it to precisely tune all the parameters of the cryptographic computation.
For each possible key k the adversary observes N (k) time over a time interval of n time
samples the power consumption of profiling device and we denote by trace the series of
observations T (k)(i) =
{
T
(k)
(i)(t) ∈ R|t ∈ [1;n]
}
, i = 1, . . . , N (k). The most common TA model
modelizes the stochastic dependency between k and trace by means of a multivariate
normal conditional density:
P
(
T
(k)
(i) |k
)
= 1√
(2pi)n |Σk|
e
− 12
(
T
(k)
(i) −µk
)
Σ−1
k
(
T
(k)
(i) −µk
)′
(1)
where µk ∈ Rn and Σk ∈ Rn×n are the expected value and the covariance of the n variate
traces respectively.
In the context of TA, two phases may be distinguished:
Profiling Phase. For each possible key k, the adversary captures N (k) traces T (k)(i) over a
time interval of length n. TA estimates the expected value µk and the covariance Σk by
µˆk =
1
N (k)
N(k)∑
i=1
T
(k)
(i) (2)
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Σˆk =
1
N (k) − 1
N(k)∑
i=1
(
T
(k)
(i) − µˆk
)> (
T
(k)
(i) − µˆk
)
(3)
Attack Phase. The attacker captures a trace T when the target device execute a crypto-
graphic algorithm. The adversary estimates the secret key which maximizes the likelihood:
kˆ = arg max
k
P (T |k) (4)
2.2.2 Deep Learning Based SCA
Deep learning based side-channel attacks focus mainly on two techniques: multi-layer
perceptrons (MLP) and convolutional neural networks (CNN) [CDP17]. Martinasek et
al. [MDM16,MHM13,MMT15] compared MLP-based methods with other classical attack
such as template attacks. Cagli et al. [CDP17] have shown that MLP-based attack is far
more effective than other classical methods. Prouff et al. [PSB+18] have demonstrated
that CNN can obtain a great success in attacking cryptographic implementations with
jitter.
Deep learning based SCA [MPP16] is similar to TA, but uses deep learning techniques
as a profiling method instead of using multivariate Gaussian profiling as in TA. To train a
deep learning model, the typical leakage models used for the power consumption are the
Hamming Weight (HW) model (9-class classification), and the Least Significant Bit (LSB)
model (2-class classification) [PEvW18]. In this paper, we also uses these two leakage
models.
MLP. MLP is also called artificial neural networks. It contains at least three layers:
in addition to the input and output layers, there can be multiple dense layers between
them. The number of neurons in the input layer is determined by the number of time
samples n in the input data. The MLP layer is fully connected (fully connected means
that each neuron in the upper layer is connected to all neurons in lower layer). If the
output of the lower layer is represented by a vector X, the output of the higher layer is
f (wijx+ bij), where wij and bij are the weight and bias of the j-th neuron in the i-th
layer respectively, and x ∈ X. Generally, the function f is sigmoid or tanh. Finally, the
output layer can be viewed as multi-class logistic regression, i.e. softmax regression. Thus,
the output of the output layer is softmax(wx+ b). The parameters of the MLP are all
the connection weight w and the bias b between the layers. The process of training these
deep learning models is the process of finding the optimal parameters. How to set the
optimal parameters is an optimization problem. To solve the optimization problem, the
easiest method is the gradient descent method.
CNN. CNN can be regarded as a variant of MLP. In addition to the input layer, dense
layer and output layer, it also uses one or more convolutional layers and pooling layer.
A convolution layer includes a convolution operation, followed by an activation function
(such as ReLU) and a pooling layer. The pooling layer is used to reduce the dimensions.
The convolutional layer performs a series of convolutional operations on its inputs (each
input is convoluted with a filter).
2.3 Adversarial Attacks
The adversary may design a targeted machine learning sample (adversarial example/trace)
to make the machine learning model misjudge. This is called an adversarial attack. Szegedy
et al. [SZS+13] first discovered an interesting weakness of deep neural networks in image
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classification. Their study shows that, despite the high accuracy of deep learning, it is
surprising that they are susceptible to adversarial attacks in the form of applying small
adversarial perturbations on source images. Mohse et al. [MDFFF17] demonstrated the
existence of universal perturbations, which can be used to fool deep learning classifiers by
adding it to arbitrary images. This work inspires us to protect cryptographic devices by
adding universal perturbations.
In fact, the deep learning based side-channel attacks are also classification problems.
They use deep learning techniques to classify side-channel traces. The labels for the
side-channel traces are key-related values. Adversarial attacks can be seen as the process
of seeking a vector v such that:
Model(T + v) 6= Model(T )
side-channel tarce T ∈ T . For each trace T , Model() outputs an estimated label Model(T ).
v is an adversarial perturbation. In the context of image classification, in order to make the
adversarial perturbation less perceptible, v is often restricted to satisfy certain restrictions.
If there is a v such that
Model(T + v) 6= Model(T ) for “most" T ∈ T ,
then v is universal perturbation.
These universal perturbations are not only universal across side-channel traces, but also
generalize well across deep learning models [SZS+13,KGB16,MDFFF17]. The deep learning
models find the decision boundaries of the data in the high-dimensional space. In order to
make v as small as possible, the adversarial perturbations are all in the neighbourhood
of decision boundaries. Even different models are used to classify side-channel traces,
as long as the models are efficient, the decision boundaries they find are similar. Such
perturbations are therefore doubly universal, both with respect to the data and the models.
That is, if we use one model to generate a set of universal perturbations, we can find that
these perturbations are still effective for another model even it was trained with different
hyperparameters or it is trained on a different set of traces.
2.3.1 One-Pixel Attack
One-pixel attack, a type of adversarial attack techniques, which fools the deep learning
classifier by changing only one pixel in the image. In order to reduce the number of inserted
noise instructions, we hope our countermeasures to modify as few pixels as possible. Thus,
in this paper we use one-pixel attack to calculate universal perturbations.
Su et al. [SVS19] claim to achieve an extreme case in adversarial attacks, and they fool
the deep learning classifier by changing only one pixel in the image. One-pixel attack is
also effective on the side-channel traces, and we show in Figure 1 an adversarial sample
on the side-channel traces generated by one-pixel attack. The upper trace is the original
trace captured during the cryptographic computation. The label for the original trace (a)
is 0, and the prediction vector calculated by classifier is [0.8141893, 0.18581069]. The deep
learning classifier can correctly classify the trace (a). We use one-pixel attack to generate
an adversarial trace (b) based on the trace (a). Trace (b) is obtained by changing one
time sample in trace (a). The modified time sample is highlighted with blue rectangle. We
use classifier to calculate the prediction vector of (b): [0.4294791, 0.57052094]. Trace (b)
is incorrectly classified as class 1 by the deep learning classifier.
One-pixel attack generates the adversarial samples using differential evolution algorithm
[DS10]. Differential evolution (DE) is a population based optimization algorithm for solving
complex multi-modal optimization problems [DS10, SP97]. The differential evolution
algorithm is composed of three phases: mutation, crossover, and selection. Mutation is
a method used to generate random solutions. Crossover is used to enhance the diversity
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of random solutions. Selection removes solutions that fail to evolve, and leaves solutions
that succeed in evolution. The differential evolution algorithm flow is as follows: first, a
sufficient number of random variables are generated as the initial possible solution. Then,
the mutation, crossover, and selection are performed in order. After completing a round, a
certain termination condition is checked. If the termination conditions have not been met,
the differential evolution algorithm returns to mutation, crossover, and selection; otherwise,
the algorithm terminates, and outputs the best solution of the last round.
When we use adversarial attack to protect cryptographic devices, the less adversarial
perturbations we insert, the easier our countermeasures can be implemented. For one-pixel
attack, we only need to add noise at one time sample. Besides, one-pixel attack requires
less network information as it is a black-box attack.
3 Threat Model
The adversary targets the secret key k∗ of a cryptographic device. We call this cryptographic
device the target device. The adversary has the same device as the target device, called the
profiling device. We consider that the cryptographic device has sufficient computational
resources to compile the code before each encryption (our countermeasures insert noise
instructions during compilation), and the adversary cannot get control over the code
compilation.
We also assume that the adversary does not use any preprocessing techniques on power
traces, but we argue that the preprocessing algorithm cannot break our countermeasures.
The effect of preprocessing techniques on our countermeasures is discussed further in Section
6. The adversary uses these two devices to carry out deep learning based side-channel
attacks. The deep learning based SCA is divided into two phases:
Profiling Phase. The attacks are performed on the 3rd key byte of the AES-128 , which
is the same as previous work [PSB+18]. In this case, we can refer to this previous work to
obtain an effective deep learning model. For each key candidate value k, the adversary
captures N (k) power traces. All these traces make up profiling traces dataset Tprofiling.
In order to analyze the effectiveness of our countermeasures on deep learning models with
different output classes, the side-channel traces are labeled using two leakage models: LSB
and HW. The adversary trains neural network using Lprofiling and Tprofiling, and obtain
a deep learning model Model().
Attack Phase. The adversary captures M side-channel traces on the target device. For
each T(i) ∈ Tattack, the adversary uses the deep learning model Model() to get a prediction
vector d(i) ∈ R|K|:
d(i) = Model
(
T(i)
)
. (5)
The adversary selects the key candidate with the highest sum confidence as the secret key
k, i.e. k = argmaxk∈K
(∏M
i=1 d(i)
)
[k]. If k = k∗, the key recovery is successful.
4 Adversarial Attack Based Security Protections
4.1 Differences
One-pixel attacks were first proposed to attack deep-learning models in the image classifi-
cation area. Although both deep learning based image classification and deep learning
based side-channel attacks use deep learning models as classifiers, there are still many
differences between them.
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Different training sets. In the context of image classification, we train the deep learning
model on source images. However, for the deep learning based SCA, the profiling traces are
captured on the profiling device. In our threat model, the profiling device is a copy of target
device and it is a cryptographic implementation with our countermeasures. Therefore, if our
countermeasures modify each trace to adversarial trace by adding adversarial perturbations,
then the profiling traces captured on profiling device are all adversarial traces. Due to the
robustness of deep learning technique, such countermeasures that insert perturbations to
turn side-channel traces into adversarial traces cannot protect cryptographic devices. The
attack results shown in Figure 2 confirm this view.
Figure 2: The mean rank of the unprotected AES and the one-pixel attacked AES on
CNN-based attack. The rank is a metric to evaluate the security level of countermeasures
(described in Section 5.2). For unprotected AES, approximately 100 traces are required
for a full success of the key recovery. For one-pixel attacked AES, performing successful
key recoveries requires approximately 20 traces.
We first collect 60, 000 power traces of unprotected AES, and we call these 60, 000
traces source traces. 50, 000 source traces are used as the training set, and 10, 000 source
traces are used as the test set, and CNN is used to attack these source traces. The attack
result is shown as unprotected AES in Figure 2. We use the one-pixel attack to generate
60, 000 adversarial traces, and we call these adversarial traces as one-pixel attacked AES
traces. We use 50, 000 one-pixel attacked AES traces as training set and 10, 000 as test set,
and use CNN to attack these traces. The attack result is shown as one-pixel attacked AES
in Figure 2. For unprotected AES, approximately 100 traces are required for a full success
of the key recovery. For one-pixel attacked AES, performing successful key recoveries
requires approximately 20 traces. Figure 2 shows that converting the source traces to
adversarial traces cannot protect the cryptographic devices, but makes the implementation
more vulnerable. The reason is that these adversarial traces have high confidence in the
wrong label, which is generally above 0.95. These adversarial traces can deceive models
trained on source traces. However, when adversary trains models on these adversarial
traces, these adversarial perturbations which fool the original model will instead become
features exploited by the deep learning techniques.
Different attack dataset sizes. In the image classification area, the purpose of the
adversarial attack is to make a certain image misclassified by a deep learning model after
adding perturbations that is not perceived by humans. We considered it a successful
adversarial attack if the image was misclassified after adding perturbations. Therefore, for
image classification area, the size of the attack dataset can be regarded as 1. In SCA area,
to perform successful key recoveries, the adversary captures M power traces on the target
device and selects the key candidate with the highest sum confidence as the secret key,
as mentioned in Section 3. The size of the attack set can be regarded as M . In order to
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thwart the deep learning SCA, our countermeasures need to modify all the power traces
generated by cryptographic computations instead of modifying one trace.
4.2 Our Method
Our countermeasures insert noise instructions into the code. The power consumption of
these noise instructions becomes universal perturbations. These universal perturbations
make power traces misclassified by the deep learning models, and then thwart the deep
learning SCA. In this process, we need to solve three problems: how to determine the
position where the noise instruction is inserted, which instructions are inserted into the
code as noise instructions, and how to insert the noise instruction at the selected position.
We address these issues in the following subsections.
4.3 Locations of Noise Insertion
We want to insert noise instructions at the locations where the universal perturbations are
located. Therefore, we generate universal perturbations, and observe their positions on
power traces. Before calculating the universal perturbations, we need to determine what
kind of universal perturbations we need to calculate. Different universal perturbations have
different effects on the deep learning classifiers. Some universal perturbations make the
confidence of a certain class very large, but some make the confidence of a certain class
very small. These effects depend on the termination condition of adversary attacks.
This subsection calculates the locations where the universal perturbations are located
based on the 2-class model (the traces are labeled as LSB of sensitive value). We analyze at
the end of this subsection that the positions calculated by 2-class model and 9-class model
are close. We consider the formula k = argmaxk∈K
(∏M
i=1 d(i)
)
[k], used by the adversary
to recover the secret key. The adversary selects the key candidate with the highest sum
confidence as the secret key. To prevent the adversary from recovering the correct key, we
can make the confidence corresponding to a certain class of all side-channel traces very large
or make the confidence corresponding to each class the same. In this way, the adversary
cannot recover the correct key. We test two termination conditions: the first termination
condition is that the algorithm terminates when each trace is classified as 0, and make
the confidence of label 0 the as large as possible, i.e. dk=0 > τ , where dk=0 denotes the
confidence corresponding to label 0 and τ is a constant close to 1. Another termination
condition: the algorithm terminates when the difference between the confidence of label 0
and label 1 within a small range, i.e. |dk=0 − dk=1| 6 σ, where σ is a constant close to 0.
Our experiments find that the second termination condition is computationally intensive
when running differential evolution algorithms. Moreover, when the leakage model is not
LSB, the labels of the traces are no longer only 0 and 1, and the second termination condition
is hard to implement. Thus, considering efficiency and versatility, our countermeasures
use the first termination condition. The steps of calculating the insertion position are as
follows:
1. We capture 60, 000 labelled traces of the power consumption of unprotected AES
implementation. The temporal acquisition window is set to record the first round
of the AES only. Each trace is composed of 5200 time samples. We experimentally
validate that the deep learning classifier trained on 50, 000 profiling traces can
successfully recover the key in less than 1000 attack traces. Therefore, we select
50, 000 traces out of 60, 000 traces as profiling traces, and train deep learning models
on these profiling traces.
2. Differential evolution algorithm is applied to generate adversarial perturbations based
on the remaining 10, 000 traces. The termination condition is that the algorithm
terminates when the trace is classified as 0.
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3. We generate 10, 000 adversarial perturbations based on MLP and CNN respectively.
The distribution of the 10, 000 adversarial perturbations on 5200 time samples is
shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b). Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that when attacking
CNN and MLP, the distributions of adversarial perturbation are similar. They all
have the largest distribution around the three time samples: 1900th time sample,
2560th time sample, and 4300th time sample. The perturbations near these three
positions are universal perturbations.
4. We use these three points as the locations of the noise insertion. Noise instructions
inserted near these three time samples can generate universal perturbations.
(a) 2-class MLP model. (b) 2-class CNN model.
(c) 9-class MLP model.
Figure 3: Distribution of adversarial perturbation. The horizontal axis represents 5200
time samples of the side-channel trace, and the vertical axis represents the number of
adversarial perturbations falling on a certain time sample.
It can be observed in the power traces of AES that these three time samples are
respectively included in three functions: AddRoundKey(), SubBytes() and MixColumns().
These functions may contain thousands of instructions, and we need to know where these
time samples are in the cryptographic code more accurately. Only by knowing the specific
location of the noise in the code can we accurately insert noise instructions into the code.
The C file is compiled to an assembly code file. We use the binary search algorithm to
traverse the instructions of the assembly file, and insert the trigger_low() function after the
instruction. This function is also the trigger signal used when we collect the power traces.
Then we compile and run the file again, and observe whether the power trace becomes
low level near the three time samples we selected earlier. If it becomes low level, then the
position of trigger_low() is the position where we want to insert the noise instructions. If
not, we continue to traverse the assembly file, and repeat the previous steps. In the process
of determining the position of insertion, we find that even if the position of inserting the
low-level signal is the same, the position of the low-level on the power trace is not the
same, but their positions are very close on the power trace. The universal perturbations
we generated are not all at a certain time sample but are concentrated around those three
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samples. Our experiments also find that if a perturbation with side-channel profile which
is similar to the side-channel profile of universal perturbation is inserted near those three
samples, the deep learning model can be deceived. Our purpose is only to find a fuzzy
location, so that the side-channel leakage generated by the noise instructions is near to
those three sampling points.
We use the 9-class MLP model to generate the adversarial perturbations, and observe
their distribution on the time sample. The results are shown in Figure 3(c). The distribution
of these perturbations is similar to the distribution of perturbations generated by the
2-class model. Since universal perturbations are doubly universal, even if we use different
deep learning models to generate universal perturbations, the positions of these universal
perturbations are close.
4.4 Choice of Noise Instructions
Previous works [CBR+16,BCHC18,AMN+11,ABP19] insert noise instructions between
each useful instruction in sensitive function Sbox. These inserted noise instructions are
commonly used in cryptographic algorithms. However, the purpose of our noise insertion is
different from these previous literatures. In previous works, the purpose of inserting noise
is to move the point of information leakage in time and space, and to reduce side-channel
leakage. Thus, in these previous literatures, the inserted noise instructions do not need
to be carefully selected. The purpose of our noise instruction is to make the captured
side-channel traces into adversarial examples.
So the instructions need to meet the following requirements: 1) the side-channel profile
(i.e. power consumption or electromagnetic radiation) of noise instructions should be as
close as possible to the profile of useful instructions, so that the adversary cannot distinguish
them and filter them out from the side-channel traces [DRS+12]; 2) the side-channel profile
of the inserted instructions should be similar to the profile of the adversarial perturbations.
The first requirement is easy to achieve, we only need to choose the instructions commonly
used in cryptographic algorithms, such as addition, subtraction, exclusive or, and load. In
order to meet the second requirement, the side-channel profile of adversarial perturbations
should be taken into account. We analyze the distribution of adversarial perturbations
over amplitude.
We perform one-pixel attacks on the 2-class MLP model and CNN model, and generate
10, 000 adversarial perturbations. Although we use the 2-class model to generate adversarial
perturbations, we analyze later that the amplitude distribution of the perturbation gener-
ated by 9-class model is the same as the distribution of 2-class model. In the differential
evolution algorithm, we limit the position of adversarial perturbation to the vicinity of
three time samples we select in Section 4.3. We show the amplitude distribution of these
adversarial perturbations near 1900th time sample and 2560th time sample in Figures 4
and 5.
Figure 4 shows the amplitude distribution of adversarial perturbations on MLP model.
The most distributed amplitudes of adversarial perturbations are −5.2 and 4.8. Figure
5 shows the amplitude distribution of the adversarial perturbations on the CNN model.
In Figure 5, the amplitudes of −5 and 3.8 have the most adversarial perturbations. In
order to deceive both CNN and MLP, the amplitude that the noise instructions need to
generate is within the interval [−5.2,−5] or [3.8, 4.8], such perturbations are more likely
to become universal perturbation. The purpose of choosing two amplitude intervals as our
criterion for selecting noise instructions is to be able to find more instructions that meet
the requirements, and to make these noise instructions effective for various deep learning
models.
In experiments, we target AES implementations running over an ARM Cortex-M3
processor. ARM Thumb1 and Thumb2 instructions are treated as a candidate noise
instruction set. We capture the energy consumption traces of instructions candidate on the
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(a) Amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 1900th time sample
(b) Amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 2560th time sample
Figure 4: Amplitude distribution of adversarial perturbation on MLP model. The values
on the horizontal axis corresponds to the amplitude of power traces. The above picture
shows the amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 1900th time sample, and the
below picture shows the amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 2560th time
sample. We divide the interval of the amplitude [−5.2, 4.8] into 160 discrete intervals.
cryptographic device, and select the instruction that can generate a suitable perturbation
size as the noise instruction.
The power consumption is not only related to instructions, but also related to operated
constants. Generally speaking, 0xff causes greater power consumption. In this paper, we
chose the four instructions listed in Listing 1 as our noise instructions. r24 in the listing
may be any free register, which is determined by the compiler during compilation.
We use 9-class MLP to generate the adversarial perturbations, and observe their
distribution. The results are shown in Figure 6. As with the 2-class model, the perturbations
generated by the 9-class model is concentrated in the largest and smallest amplitude.
The noise instructions which we select using 2-class model can still generate universal
perturbation in 9-class model.
Listing 1: Inserted noise instructions
mov r24 , 0 x f f
ori r24 , 0 x f f
ld i r24 , 0 x f f
in r24 , 0x3d
4.5 Inserting Noise Instructions
The last step of our countermeasures is to insert the selected noise instructions into the
selected positions. In this work, we insert noise instructions into the code at compile time.
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(a) Amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 1900th time sample
(b) Amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 2560th time sample
Figure 5: Amplitude distribution of adversarial perturbation on CNN model. The values
on the horizontal axis corresponds to the amplitude of power traces. The above picture
shows the amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 1900th time samples, and the
below picture shows the amplitude distribution of perturbations near the 2560th time
samples. We divide the interval of the amplitude [−5.2, 4.8] into 160 discrete intervals.
We start by annotating the assembly file at target positions. The annotated assembly file
is recompiled before each invocation of the cryptosystem: when the compiler recognizes
these annotations, it randomly picks ω noise instructions from Listing 1, and inserts
them to the code, where ω is an integer in {0, 1, 2}. The purpose of inserting different
numbers of instructions is to increase the diversity of the code. In order to ensure that
the side-channel leakage of each invocation of the cryptosystem becomes an adversarial
sample, our approach requires that the cryptographic device recompiles the code at each
invocation.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate our countermeasures as a defense against deep learning based SCA. In order
to demonstrate that our countermeasures are also effective for the classical side-channel
attacks, we perform template attacks on our countermeasures. For convenience, we refer
to our countermeasures as one-pixel protection AES in the following content.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We use a STM32F3 board fitted with an Arm Cortex-M3 core running at 32MHz, 16kB of
RAM, and 128kB of flash memory. It does not provide any hardware security mechanisms
against SCA. Our AES implementation is an unprotected 8-bit implementation that follows
the NIST specification.
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Figure 6: Amplitude distribution of adversarial perturbation near the 1900th time sample
on 2-class MLP model.
The side-channel traces are obtained with a Pico5444B PicoScope. The sampling
acquisition is performed at 96 Msample/s. In this scenario, the length of one processor
cycle on the side channel trace is three time samples. To ease the temporal alignment
of the side-channel traces, a trigger signal is set, and held high during the execution of
the first AES round. Using this setup, the security evaluation is performed with stricter
conditions than it would be in practice for an adversary.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
We use two metrics to evaluate the performance of different AES implementations against
attacks, which are the rank function and the accuracy.
With the same previous notations in Section 2.1, we define the score function SM [k] of
the key candidates k :
SM [k] =
M∏
i=1
d(i)[k]. (6)
According to Equation 6 we can define the rank function:
rank (Model,Dprofiling,Dattack,M) = |{k ∈ K|SM [k] > SM [k∗]}| . (7)
When the rank of k∗ is 0, we perform a successful key recovery. The larger the M required
to recover the correct key, the better the implementation performs against side-channel
attacks. To get a better measure of the rank, it is more suitable to estimate its mean value
over several pairs of datasets.
The second metric is the accuracy which is commonly used in machine learning. We
define it as:
acc (Model,Dprofiling ,Dattack ) =
∣∣{k∗ ∈ K|k∗ = argmaxk∈K d(i)[k]}∣∣
|Dattack| . (8)
In this paper, accuracy is used to evaluate the performance of 2-class models. The numbers
of elements of each class are equal. Thus, it is adequate using the accuracy as metric. The
lower the accuracy, the better the security of the countermeasure.
5.3 Resistance to Practical Attacks
In this section, we use MLP and CNN to attack three different AES implementations,
including unprotected AES implementation, random noise AES and one-pixel protection
AES. In order to demonstrate that the effectiveness of one-pixel protection AES is due
to the carefully selected insertion position and noise instructions, we implement random
noise AES: randomly inserting noise instructions at three random locations in the first
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round of AES. The inserted noise instructions are randomly selected among instructions
that are commonly used in AES programs.
We capture 60, 000 power traces for each AES implementation, and each trace is
composed of 5, 200 time samples. To get a better measure of the rank function and the
accuracy, we therefore need to calculate their mean value on several pairs of data sets.
Among the 60, 000 traces, 10, 000 traces are randomly selected as the test set, and the
remaining 50, 000 traces are used as the training set. Repeating this process 10 times, we
get 10 different data sets.
In order to analyze the effectiveness of our method on deep learning models with
different output classes, we train four deep learning models: 9-class CNN model (HW
leakage model), 2-class CNN model (LSB leakage model), 9-class MLP model and 2-class
MLP model. The CNN and MLP architecture used in this paper refers to [PSB+18]. Since
our target are unmasked AES, we reduce the number of epochs. For MLP, the activation
function is Relu and softmax, the optimizer is RMSprop, the learning rate is 0.00001, batch
size is 256, and the number of epochs is 100. For CNN, we use the Softmax activation
function in the classification layer combined with the Categorical/Binary Cross Entropy
loss function. The learning rate is 0.0001, the optimizer is RMSprop, batch size is 256,
and the number of epochs is 10.
5.3.1 2-Class Model
Figure 7 shows the results of MLP-based attack on three AES implementations. (a), (b),
and (c) respectively represent the unprotected AES implementation, the random noise
AES and the one-pixel protection AES. Figure 8 shows the results of CNN-based attacks
on these three AES implementations. For unprotected AES implementation, MLP and
CNN recover secret key in 340 and 300 traces respectively. For random noise AES, MLP
cannot retrieve the key in less than 10, 000 traces, and CNN needs about 2650 traces to
recovery keys. For one-pixel protection AES, MLP and CNN cannot retrieve the secret
key in less than 10, 000 traces.
The inserted noise instructions make the power traces of random noise AES into
desynchronized traces. Therefore, MLP cannot recover the key of random noise AES. The
convolution layer is the main difference between CNN and MLP, and it allows the former
has the property of shift-invariant [CDP17]. Because of this, CNN can still recover the
key of random noise AES in presence of desynchronization.
Although CNN can learn shift-invariant features, our countermeasures can still thwart
CNN attacks by inserting noise. The noise instructions and insertion positions are carefully
selected, and they can generate universal perturbations. Such universal perturbations are
doubly universal, both with respect to the data and the network architecture. Therefore,
we use a model trained on unprotected AES traces to generate a set of universal pertur-
bations, which can still deceive other models, even when it was trained with different
hyperparameters or when it was trained on a different set of traces.
We calculate correlation factor for the captured side-channel traces (see Figure 9). The
adversary usually selects the points that leak the most information by calculating the
correlation factors of the traces. In general, samples with a large correlation leak more
side-channel information. Figure 9 shows that the distribution of correlation factors is very
similar to the distribution of adversarial perturbations. Therefore, the positions where we
insert the noise are the positions with larger correlation. This makes it more difficult for
the adversary to recover the key.
Table 1 shows the mean accuracy of three AES implementations attacked by deep
learning based side-channel attacks. In the experiments in this subsection, the trace is
labeled with the LSB of the output of the third Sbox during the first round. So, among the
side-channel traces, two classes may be distinguished: 0 and 1. When the accuracy is closer
to 0.5, it means that the corresponding AES achieves better resistance to side-channel
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(a) Unprotected AES (b) Random noise AES
(c) One-pixel protection AES
Figure 7: The mean rank of different AES implementations on MLP-based attacks. (a)
unprotected AES, 340 traces are required for a successful key recovery. (b) Random noise
AES, MLP cannot retrieve the secret key in 10, 000 traces. (c) One-pixel protection AES,
MLP cannot retrieve the secret key in 10, 000 traces.
(a) Unprotected AES (b) Random noise AES
(c) One-pixel protection AES
Figure 8: The mean rank of different AES implementations on CNN-based attacks. (a)
unprotected AES, 300 traces are required for a successful key recovery. (b) Random-noise
AES, 2650 traces are required for a successful key recovery. (c) One-pixel protection AES,
CNN cannot retrieve the secret key in less than 10, 000 traces.
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Figure 9: Correlation of side-channel traces
attacks. The table shows that our security protection is very effective, making the accuracy
very close to 0.5. In this situation, the deep learning model can hardly correctly classify
the side-channel traces.
Table 1: Mean accuracy of different AES implementations attacked by MLP and CNN
Model
Mean accuracy AES
Unprotected Random-
noise
One-pixel
protection
CNN 0.7231 0.6296 0.5063
MLP 0.7083 0.5004 0.5023
5.3.2 9-Class Model
In the experiments in this subsection, the trace is labeled with the HW of the third output
bytes of the Sbox during the first round. To compare with one-pixel protection AES, we
also use 9-class model to attack unprotected AES. As in the previous sections, we have a
set of 50, 000 power traces for the profiling phase and have a set of 10, 000 power traces
for the attack phase.
Figures 10 and 11 show respectively the mean rank of different AES implementations
on 9-class MLP attack and CNN attack. The attack results are similar to those of the
2-class model. One-pixel protection AES can thwart 9-class CNN and MLP attacks. The
reason is that the perturbations generated by inserted noise instructions are universal
perturbations, and they can deceive models trained with different hyperparameters.
(a) Unprotected AES (b) One-pixel protection AES
Figure 10: The mean rank of different AES implementations on 9-class MLP attacks.
(a) unprotected AES, 10 traces are required for a successful key recovery. (b) One-pixel
protection AES, MLP cannot retrieve the secret key in 10, 000 traces.
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(a) Unprotected AES (b) One-pixel protection AES
Figure 11: The mean rank of different AES implementations on 9-class CNN attacks.
(a) unprotected AES, 50 traces are required for a successful key recovery. (b) One-pixel
protection AES, CNN cannot retrieve the secret key in 10, 000 traces.
5.4 Resistance to Classical Side-Channel Attacks
TA are considered as the most successful method in classical SCA. We use TA to evaluate
the security level of our countermeasures. We use the TA algorithm described in Section
2.2.1. We perform template attacks exploiting quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA)
which is a well-known generative strategy in the machine learning literature [Fis36] to
perform classification. We perform QDA on power traces composed of 5, 200 time samples,
and do not perform any dimension reduction operation before the TA. As in previous
sections, we have a set of 50, 000 power traces for the profiling phase and have a set of
10, 000 power traces for the attack phase. The attack results are illustrated in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Rank of the correct key attacked by a QDA (Template Attack). For unprotected
AES, the key can be retrieved with 560 traces. For one-pixel protection AES and random
noise AES, within 10, 000 traces, the key cannot be retrieved.
Figure 12 illustrates that, TA only requires 560 traces to perform a successful key
recovery on unprotected AES, but it cannot retrieve the secret key of one-pixel protection
AES and random noise AES in less than 10, 000 traces. This demonstrates that, not
only for deep learning based SCA, one-pixel protection AES is also effective for classical
side-channel attacks. The performance of TA highly depends on some preliminary phases,
such as the traces realignment or the selection of the points of interest. Our method can
thwart TA for two reasons: 1) we insert noise instructions, and these noise instructions are
of variable length, which causes the power traces to be synchronized; 2) the positions of
the noise instructions we insert is also the point where the power traces have the greatest
correlation, which reduce the correlation between the key k and the power traces.
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5.5 Execution Time Overhead
Table 2 compares the execution time (in cycles, measured for 1000 executions of each AES
implementation) of the unprotected AES and our countermeasures. The unprotected AES
executes in 5482 processor cycles. The one pixel protection in 15952 to 21328 processor
cycles (average 16418 cycles). Table 2 shows that our countermeasures lead to an increase
in execution time overhead. The increased execution time overhead is mainly caused by
the recompilation at each execution.
Table 2: Execution time of the unprotected AES and one-pixel protection AES
Unprotected One-pixel protection
min. avg. max. min. avg. max.
Execution time
(cycles)
5479 5482 5486 15952 16418 21328
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We argue that the current preprocessing algorithms cannot break our countermeasures. In
order to break countermeasures of inserting noise instructions, some previous works use
correlation analysis techniques (e.g. Hidden Markov Models [DRS+12]) to detect different
types of patterns in leakage traces. So that the adversary can distinguish noise instructions
and filter them out from the side-channel traces. The reason for the effectiveness of
such correlation analysis techniques is that the side-channel profile of noise instructions
is different from the profile of useful instructions. Our countermeasures insert noise
instructions that are often used in programs, and recompile the code at each invocation.
Although this increases the execution time, it ensures that the inserted noise instructions
do not have distinguishable headers and tails. Therefore, our countermeasures will not
be broken by such techniques. In the context of image classification, there are some
works that use dimension reduction techniques to thwart adversarial attacks (e.g. image
compression [DGR16] , Principal Component Analysis [HG16]). Moreover, most of the
existing dimension reduction are less effective. Their works demonstrate that dimension
reduction techniques can reduce the interference of adversarial samples to the model,
However, it also reduces the accuracy of the model’s classification of normal examples.
Existing methods for generating adversarial examples generally optimize the real
examples or add perturbations to the real examples based on the gradient of the model.
GAN can train a generator to generate adversarial examples without adding disturbances
to specific samples. The samples generated by GAN have the advantage of being more
diverse. However, GAN also has the problem that the generated samples change too
much compared to the real samples. How to design constraint functions to ensure that
GAN can generate adversarial examples of the target category without introducing huge
perturbations is the direction of our future work.
In this paper, we present a new direction for achieving protection of cryptographic
devices through one-pixel attack techniques. Based on the one-pixel attack techniques,
we find the most vulnerable time samples on the side-channel observations, and find
the noise instructions that may deceive the deep learning models. We implement our
countermeasures and conduct experiments to evaluate the security level. Experiments
show that our countermeasures can protect cryptographic devices against deep learning
side-channel attacks. Our method is also effective enough against classical side-channel
attacks, which makes it more competitive.
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